Polaris solar PV net news: the development of PV industry in China in the past is a miracle.
Last century, industrialization of China PV industry had just started at the beginning of this century, when looking around, is to keep conversion rates for a long time the world leading Japan enterprises sharp, is known as Europe’s largest solar energy group Germany company Conergy, they have to look up to see. Look back at yourself, being positioned for the equipment, raw materials, market “three-headed” has no derogatory meaning, when the Chinese PV industry move bricks is a Drudge. Less than 20 years, China PV industry from scratch, from small to large, from the largest to the largest. Once again, this time looking around, Sharpe was purchased by Taiwanese company Hon Hai, Conergy and raw materials assets married United States, upstream assets bought by chint Chinese famous enterprises, which makes “global PV installed capacity is over 270GW, over 70% of products from China.”
If it’s just a miracle attributed to Chinese labor bonus must be wrong, this miracle as one of the most successful in the history of the world industry, and dissent, is problematic, and the number of Chinese PV industry business models (including development, “study series” the same) and its value must be an important part of the development process.
In the past 20 years of development, China PV industry after three stages. The first is at the end of the 2004-“bright project” supporting early stage; the second from 2004 to 2011 – the processing of export-oriented development stage; and the third is August 1, 2011 to 2016 “630”-PV + power station construction comprehensive development stages of product production.
With China’s PV industry in different stages of development, photovoltaic companies trying different business models, walking on the edge of the rise and fall.
The first phase, although business models hard business model, or a “survival mode” is more accurate. Because at the time of the Chinese PV industry is “looking for rice, to maintain production” situation, when you have food to eat, all capacity can not meet a “bright project” needs. When you don’t eat, famous 2003 Suntech had two months no salary. Summary this phase in 2013 and PV industry-wide loss business model to the conclusion that: the business model of value to the enterprise of the future.
The second phase, coexistence of different business models, industry expansion business births and deaths. In 2004, Germany as a representative of the European PV demand is soaring, making China’s PV industry quickly took off, 99% products are exported, also makes the concept of Silicon material, all kinds of equipment. Production expansion to wafer production from the modules or even expand to silicon production? Is the road of specialization is the road of vertically integrated industrial chain? Become the PV industry bosses of that period’s most tangled problem. This this is Enterprise Economics in the two species different of commercial mode, matter on wrong, can from that a stage China PV enterprise of development results see, general high liabilities heavily Silicon material of, game dimension bankruptcy has, British Lee currently still in dilemma among, Suntech bankruptcy also cannot said and this is relationship are no, only recently Gao jifan in accept interview Shi of stolen HI: because then in decided established million tons Silicon material factory Hou of fourth a months on announced gave up, to has has today advanced technology representative, and global capacity first of days collection. Summary business model at this stage to the conclusion that: a company change business models rhythms decide the life and death of an enterprise.
The third phase, “two types of promoting” the proliferation of business models, services, Internet business model of thinking. From 2011, Qinghai solar “930” by 2016 China PV “630”, built from 2011 year built 2.5GW to year 2016 might 30GW, China has carried out an extensive, you can load energy annals of the PV power plant building boom, funds of no less than 500 billion yuan, built power plants totaled 65GW (by the end of 2015 is 43GW). In this process in the, regardless of is production component of also is production bracket of, regardless of is do production of also is do investment of, regardless of is rich of also is didn’t money of, are into to this field tide among, and are no a exception to used simple gross of relies on various relationship first gets power station index, and again for funds support of “two type promoted” commercial mode. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that is, distributed PV and PV market appearance of the two markets, lead to the emergence of a number of small and medium enterprises, formed the Internet as gene, service-oriented business models. Summary conclusions of the business model of this phase is that different business models are rapidly opening distance between the different enterprises, and will determine the future of different enterprises.
Future PV market must be greater than anyone imagined, but now must hold so much of the Chinese PV industry. “630” is an important turning point of PV industry in China, from immaturity to maturity, from being flooded by start of the transition to natural monopolies. In this process, the business model as well as three stages in the past, will still play a role of life and death decisions PV enterprises.
What business models will crop up? Will bring the kind of photovoltaic companies win? Is the “photovoltaic business model” series in the first place.
Many years ago, “China first” Deng DeLong on Mr Liu said “Lenovo mobile strategy was wrong.” Then again, Liu Deng said Lenovo mobile money. Deng replied: “making money even worse.” Solar entrepreneurs must all know Lenovo Mobile’s results, but may not be able to think and decided this is a result of the positioning and orientation of the business model.
Original title: China Solar business model playback